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 n November 20, 2004 Celso Furtado passed away, that great Brazilian economist
        who so much influenced contemporary notions of under-development.
I met Celso during the heyday of Latin American structuralism, of which he was one of
the founders. We were among a handful of economists who had the privilege of being
at the inception of that great experiment that CEPAL turned out to be. At that time, quite
independently from one another, Raúl Prebisch and I came across an idea that challenged
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantages. We observed a tendency for the terms of
trade of countries exporting raw materials to deteriorate over time. Trade, it seemed, was
a key channel for transferring resources from poor to rich countries, thus perpetuating
the conditions of under-development in the periphery of the world economy. Breaking
out of this cycle required deliberate policies to support so-called infant industries and
expand the domestic market to lay the foundations for self-sustaining growth.
Furtado became a major influence the moment he joined us. He brought in an unusual
knowledge of economic theory and of Brazil’s history, society and culture. Especially
important were his insights about the specificity of under-development, the asymmetrical
yet complementary links between developed and underdeveloped countries, and the
structural dualism of the latter which reproduced, locally, that which existed between the
industrialized, modern center and the dependent economies of the world´s periphery.
Celso was not simply a man of ideas; he was also a man of action. From the mid-1950s
until 1964, he would occupy important posts in BNDE, Brazil’s development bank, where
he laid out a development blueprint for his country’s impoverished Northeast, at the
helm of the newly created SUDENE and then as planning minister. I worked closely with
him during his years at SUDENE, when we were confident that development planning
could help overcome the structural backwardness of his beloved native region.
With the 1964 coup, Celso was banned from political life and forced into exile. Over the
next two decades, he would pursue a distinguished academic career at Yale, Cambridge
and Sorbonne, devoting time to his writings and polishing his ideas about the nature
of under-development. They achieved such recognition as to earn him a place in the
pantheon of the pioneers of development, alongside a dozen other gifted economists
that included A. Hirschman, A. Lewis, G. Myrdal, R. Prebisch, W. Rostow, D. Seers and
J. Tinbergen. I would also count myself among his admirers.
In a sense, Furtado’s passing is emblematic of that of a generation of visionary people
who saw the world the way it was, and dreamed of a different one. Much has changed
since those days. There is more complexity now than we knew then. Globalization has
brought a level of interconnectedness among nations that we could not have imagined.
The stylized elegance of the center-periphery idea would appear to have been superseded
in today’s multifarious world. But in many respects, the essential insights of Furtado and
his fellow thinkers remain intact, in light of the persistent asymmetries in today’s global
economy and its failure to deliver more space for home-grown, sustained development
in poor countries or greater welfare to its citizens.
This issue of In Focus pays tribute to a remarkable intellectual from the South, who
despaired about the dismal social consequences of a certain development trajectory
and tried to chart an alternative path premised on a more active role for the state and
public policy. The outstanding selection of writings is a testimony to Furtado’s own
stature. Included here are articles by former President of Brazil Fernando Henrique
Cardoso, UN Under-Secretary General José Antonio Ocampo, Vice Chancellor Deepak
Nayyar of Delhi University, Professor Emeritus Paul Streeten of Boston University,
sociologist Peter Evans of Berkeley, and economist Ricardo Ffrench-Davis of CEPAL. It is
hoped that their ideas, some of which revisit Celso’s own, will help rekindle the debate
that he so ably posed against the present background of unfettered globalization,
market fundamentalism and minimalist states.
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and inequality in the developing world.
Based in Brazil, IPC is a global policy think-tank
established by UNDP in 2004 to promote greater
understanding of the challenges of tackling
poverty and deprivation in developing countries.
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Portrait of a Public
Intellectual
 by Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
Instituto FHC,
Brazil
Celso Furtado was perhaps
Brazil’s most influential
economist of the last fifty
years. His analyses of Brazil’s
economic history remain an
essential reference to this day.
An ardent proponent of state-
led industrialization, he not
only gave an intellectual
response to the challenges of
his day but intervened
actively in the public arena
before the onset of military
rule in the 1960s.
The challenges of
development are qualitatively
different today. But while it
may be easy to dismiss some
of Furtado’s optimism about
the possibilities of state-led,
endogenous growth, it would
be impossible to ignore his
tremendous contributions
to our self-consciousness
and to the broader dialogue
on development.
Amidst a generation that left an
indelible mark in Latin America’s politics
and economic thinking of the 1950s and
1960s, Celso Furtado stood out from his
contemporaries. Like nobody else, he
embodied what today is called a public
intellectual, devoting his mind and
energies to the great cause of his time
— finding a path to development.
Latin America’s structuralism was premised
on the idea that under-development
represented an inescapable historic
condition from which the continent
would not emerge in the absence of
deliberate public policies. Trade relations
based on the free movement of capital
and goods would condemn the countries
in the world’s periphery to a situation of
under-development.
Under the influence of Lord Keynes, it
was believed that the state had a major
role to play in creating the conditions
that would allow countries to overcome
backwardness — a negative state of
things that market forces, left alone,
could only worsen. In their path out of
under-development, the countries from
the periphery would not follow the same
trajectory that those in the center of the
capitalist system had in previous
centuries. Development planning held the
key to a different future — by preventing
the inflationary and balance-of-payments
crises that are typically associated with a
process of structural change.
The cornerstone of structuralist thinking
was the notion of a historic trend
towards worsening terms of trade for
the primary products exported by
developing countries vis-à-vis the
manufactured goods produced by
industrialized countries. This observation
was based on price series data
elaborated by Hans Singer in the late
1940s, which gave rise to a highly
influential thesis presented by
Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch in
a famous book of 1949 that quickly
became a species of political and
intellectual manifesto of Latin
American structuralism.
More than fifty years later, it is not
difficult to identify gaps in the ideas
and recommendations put forward by
CEPAL. It would now be unthinkable to
expect the state to play the same
developmental role it was attributed
back then, or to argue that development
requires severing the bonds that tie
peripheral countries to the rest of the
world economy.
More difficult, though, is to find
adequate answers to the fundamental
challenge posed by CEPAL — how social
relations, productive structures and the
terms in which the region participates in
the international division of labor can
be restructured so as to deliver greater
socio-economic development and well-
being to its people. This issue, central to
Latin America’s contemporary agenda,
continues to elude us even if the social
and economic changes experienced
throughout the continent as well as in
the international economy demand
radically different solutions today.
Hard as it is to ignore the relevance of
the question raised by CEPAL over fifty
years ago, it would be even harder to
understate the value of Celso Furtado’s
work. He did not just follow in Prebisch’s
footsteps but contributed greatly to
the evolution of structuralist thinking,
offering a remarkably novel
interpretation of Brazil’s economic
history since the apogee of the single-
crop model of development based on
the exploitation of sugar cane. Furtado’s
classic Economic Formation of Brazil, first
published in 1953 and then revised and
reprinted in 1959, marks a high point in
his intellectual and political journey.4 United Nations Development Programme
Much like Prebisch’s seminal book did
for Latin America, Furtado’s knit together
a number of ideas about Brazil’s
industrialization that had not yet found
a broad, systematic interpretation. His all-
encompassing analysis was solidly
grounded on economic theory, yet at
the same time sought to provide
concrete, practical answers to the decisive
policy challenges of his time. To this day,
it remains an essential reference for
understanding Brazil’s economic history.
Based on a thorough examination of the
Brazilian economy since the colonial era,
Furtado was able to identify the main
obstacles that were preventing the
country’s development in the 1950s.
Of deeply Kenynesian inspiration, his
analysis attributed a decisive role to the
aggregate demand in pump-priming
development in the countries of the
world’s periphery.
For him, Brazil was at a critical stage in
the process of industrialization. The easy
phase of import substitution was
reaching its limits. Basic infrastructure
was missing, heavy industry was very
fragile, and there was virtually no local
production of capital goods. Rising
inflation, recurrent balance of payment
crises and the slowing pace of growth
were clear symptoms of the problems the
Brazilian economy was facing at the time.
These bottlenecks were the inevitable
result of the exhaustion of the prevailing
model of accumulation, aggravated by
the political impasse over how to resolve
such structural tensions.
High inflation rates were nothing but a
socially perverse reflection of the huge
financing effort the government had to
make to push industrialization forward.
In the absence of fiscal reform, it could
not resort to non-inflationary means to
finance the necessary investments.
The orthodox recipe of belt-tightening
was no solution. Falling public
investment and credit would only
perpetuate the stop-and-go cycle of the
economy, in which short growth spells
seemed inevitably to end in inflation or
balance-of-payment crises.
The only lasting solution, according to
Furtado, lay in planning a new cycle of
investments that would increase the
economy’s capacity to respond to a more
diversified demand while containing the
imbalances that would unavoidably
occur as each sector adjusted to a new
pattern of accumulation. This required a
stronger state — one with greater ability
to plan, finance and lead the
development process.
Furtado had high confidence in Brazil’s
industrial prospects. At the same time,
he was skeptical about the private
sector’s capacity to lead the process.
His skepticism was not merely based on
its alleged lack of entrepreneurship but
also on structural factors, such as the
elite’s propensity to indulge in
conspicuous consumption — particularly
the land-owning elite tied to large,
unproductive holdings. Furtado’s
opinion of private foreign capital was
even more negative. He did not see a
role for it other than circumscribed to
non-strategic sectors.
In a fundamental way, development
was a task for the state — a task that
required a series of reforms to facilitate
the transition to the new phase of
industrialization. One was fiscal and
administrative reform. Its aim would
be to provide the public sector with
the means and ways for leading the
development process, including
through increased direct taxation
of incomes.
The other was agrarian reform, which
would eliminate unproductive
landholding and thereby promote a
modern rural economy. The resulting
increases in agricultural productivity
and output would free labor for the
growing manufacturing sector, while the
reduction in the relative price of
foodstuffs would improve the
purchasing power of urban workers.
A large spectrum of political forces
gravitated towards this ambitious
agenda for national development, the
small yet influential Communist Party
among them. But unlike the
communists, Furtado did not see
structural reform as being part of a
revolutionary discourse — a step in the
transition to socialism — but as a
prerequisite for democratizing
capitalism. Expanding access to urban
labor markets, consumption goods and
a range of social rights guaranteed by
the state — that is, incorporating
previously excluded people as workers,
consumers and citizens — was the
essence of this agenda. By the same
token, agrarian reform was not intended
as a clean break with the past that might
lead to collective forms of production.
The strength of Furtado’s democratic
faith and his emphasis on distributive
questions set him clearly apart from
certain types of developmentalism that
would characterize some adherents of
the military regime in the early years
after 1964. As he saw it, the expansion
of manufacturing in a peripheral country
like Brazil, where a backward rural sector
absorbed the bulk of the workforce,
would lead to a greater concentration
of incomes as the gap in returns between
those still trapped in low-productivity
employment and those being
increasingly integrated into the modern
urban economy continued to widen.
But Furtado believed that the country
was at a point where further
development would not be possible in
the absence of a massive redistribution
of income. Redistribution, therefore, was
not just a moral imperative but an
economic necessity of his time. This
notion convinced him that Brazil would
stagnate under military rule.
Inflation, structural reform, financing of
development, strengthening of the state
vis-à-vis foreign capital — these were all
questions at the top of the political
agenda of the day, not only in Brazil but
throughout the continent.
Furtado understood the profound
implications of that agenda on the
existing distribution of power and
wealth in Latin American societies.
Furtado believed Brazil
was at the doorsteps of
becoming a modern
industrial economy —
and proposed a program
for crossing that
threshold.International Poverty Centre   In Focus   April  2005    5
In Development and Underdevelopment,
published in 1961, he trained his eye on
the conflict between an Executive
branch which represented the urban
vote and could become the standard-
bearer of reform, and a Congress where
conservative agrarian factions prevailed.
As planning minister in the early 1960s
he tried hard to reconcile the ambitious
goals of the reformist agenda with the
short-term need to stabilize a
zigzagging economy. He was perfectly
conscious that economic instability
could only breed a fateful spiral of
social conflict and political uncertainty.
In the end, the political impasse at
that critical juncture in our history was
resolved at the expense of democracy.
Brazil inaugurated a cycle of military
rule that would spread rapidly to other
countries in the region.
Contradicting Furtado’s expectations,
Brazil did not stagnate under the
military. Led by a deepening of
industrialization, its economy expanded
in great strides even though income
distribution worsened and poverty
remained unreasonably high for a
country where per capita income was
rising markedly. In a seeming paradox,
the authoritarian regime did not break
with the model of state-led import
substitution. It simply reoriented it,
putting the state apparatus at the
service of a quicker, more effective
process of capital accumulation.
The military thus brought import
substitution to a state of paroxysm.
Faced with an adverse external
environment characterized by financial
instability and quickening technological
change, Brazil — Latin America’s most
successful case of state-led development
— plunged into a deep crisis at the start
of the 1980s from which it would not
recover until the mid-1990s.
With hindsight, it is obvious that
Furtado erred in his prognosis of the
evolution of the Brazilian economy
under authoritarian rule. His confidence
in the state’s ability to plan and lead an
endogenous process of self-reliant
development was likewise exaggerated.
None of this, however, diminishes the
value of his work or the relevance of
his analysis of that defining moment in
the 1950s when the country found itself
at a crossroads.
Indeed, one major gap of my generation
of intellectuals has been our failure to
examine the more qualitative aspects of
state intervention in the region. The sad
truth is that the state in Latin America
has generally been inefficient and often
riddled with corruption, especially under
the military. Had it acted differently, as
in some countries in Asia, its impact on
the region’s development would have
been another story.
Over the years since I joined CEPAL in
1964, Celso and I were in close touch
with one another. I always admired his
vast culture, his simple manners and his
brilliant mind. I disagreed with him
sometimes, as he did with me.
Dependency and Development in Latin
America, which I published with Enzo
Falleto in 1968, questions Celso’s
stagnation thesis, albeit indirectly. Unlike
him, we believed that development
could continue apace under military rule
— even if relegated to a dependent status
in the periphery of the capitalist system.
But like him, we also believed in a more
active state and a development model
that would be less conditioned by the
outside world.
True to his ideas, Furtado was critical of
my government. He thought my policies
weakened the state and undermined the
economy when, in my view, we were
rather rebuilding the former and
resurrecting the latter from the ashes
left by the collapse of the state-led
development model.
Today’s challenges are altogether
different. Industrializing is no longer an
issue. How to strengthen the capacity to
innovate and compete in the global
economy while reducing the extreme
disparities that shame the region is at
the top of Latin America’s contemporary
agenda. A difficult challenge, to be sure,
particularly in light of the persistent
asymmetries in the world economic
system and the continent’s poor record
of investing in their people.
The state has a vital role in meeting this
challenge. But unlike before, its part is
not that of a development condottièro
but of an agent capable of coordinating
the long-term interests of the society it
represents and ensuring the availability
of public goods that the market cannot
supply by itself. This is admittedly a less
‘epic’ role than in the past, but at once
more ‘sophisticated’.
Knowledge and information are now
more vital to development. Distinctions
between the national and the supra-
national are less clear-cut than before.
Businesses and civil associations have
assumed greater importance in both
of those spheres. Decisions that have
key development implications depend
more and more on nations acting in
concert. And the grounds for
legitimating public policy have
widened alongside the expansion of
democratic demands for greater
accountability in the domestic and
international decision-making process.
All of these changes call for a major
qualitative change in the role of the
state towards one that is more
sophisticated than in earlier periods.
After two decades of reforms, some
more successful than others, the
political tensions in Latin America today
are closely associated with the quest for
re-investing the state with the capacity
to coordinate and implement long-term
policy agendas. This process takes time,
which may conflict with society’s search
for immediate results.
It is a conflict that the low legitimacy
of the continent’s democratic
institutions will not help resolve. That is
one of the reasons why strengthening
democratic institutions should be taken
as a central dimension of present and
future reform agendas.
The state can no longer
be the Deus ex machina
of development, but its
role is no less vital than
before.6 United Nations Development Programme
The Need for Home-
Grown Development
Strategies
 by Ricardo Ffrench-Davis,
Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (CEPAL)
The uncritical adoption of
the neo-liberal recipe of the
Washington Consensus across
Latin America has delivered
little growth and no
improvements in equity,
but considerable disruption
and volatility to the region’s
economies. Most unwise was
the push towards full opening
of the capital account.
Countries need to revisit the
reforms of the 1990s, paying
greater attention to their
timing, sequencing and
dosage. They also need to
focus on the real economy so
as to create an environment
conducive to growth
with equity.
Among the many insights that Celso
Furtado and his fellow structuralists passed
on to successive generations of Latin
American thinkers was his admonition
that countries should avoid adopting
uniform policy packages that cannot be
applied in economies that are structurally
different. Instead, he stressed the need for
countries to “craft their own development
strategies”. This advice, unfortunately, has
not always been heeded.
There is no denying that Latin American
economies were in need of reform in the
1980s. But there was something evidently
wrong in the way the reforms took place.
Starting in the 1990s, the region suffered
a fierce homogenization under the aegis
of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’.
The policies that were adopted in country
after country did achieve some significant
results. Most managed to bring down
historically high inflation rates to single
digits. Public sector deficits in the five-
year period that preceded the contagion
of the East Asian crises stood at around
1.5% of GDP, which is not bad in relative
terms. And the volume of exports grew
vigorously, between 8% and 9% per year
during the decade.
Despite these accomplishments, the net
balance of the reforms of the 1990s is
frustrating. After 15 long years of neo-
liberal policies, massive privatization of
public firms and liberalization of trade and
capital markets, overall GDP growth in the
region has merely averaged 2.6% per
annum between 1990 and 2004. There has
also been stagnation in output per worker,
with greater job instability and falling
average income for non-waged workers.
This worsening was partly associated
with the persistence of a low investment
ratio — at a time, paradoxically, when
financial investment was rising — and a
lack of emphasis on labor training and
measures to expand access to capital
markets for small and medium-scale firms.
As a consequence, the distribution of
opportunities as well as productivity
became even more skewed than before the
reforms — a very unfriendly environment
for most firms as well as labor.
One typical feature of under-development,
in fact, is the extent to which key markets
are absent or incomplete. The idea that
they would emerge spontaneously with
sweeping liberalization is simply naïve.
Years after the reforms, entire market
segments that are vital for growth and
equity were still not in place. Moreover,
some market segments respond faster
to liberalization than others. Liberalizing
prematurely or too abruptly may actually
disrupt markets and generate many ‘losers’,
as evidenced by the rise in the numbers
of poor people and the worsening of
income distribution in the region.
Clearly, the timing, sequencing and
dosage of reforms matter greatly.
Yet the ‘Washington Consensus’ was
implemented in Latin America as if the
same economic laws applied everywhere.
They obviously don’t, especially when
crucial market segments are missing or
underdeveloped — or when economic
agents are so diverse and heterogeneous
that their capacity to respond to sudden
change and instability differs widely.
What is more, the policies of the
‘Washington Consensus’ were enacted
as if the introduction of reforms were a
goal in itself, instead of an input for
growth and equitable markets. It was
assumed that ‘more of the same’, as long
as it implied liberalizing, was always
better — no matter what the speed and
sequencing of reforms or the missing
ingredients for making them work, such
as the ‘incomplete’ financial markets that
characterize the region.International Poverty Centre   In Focus   April  2005    7
Predictably, the outcome was not market
friendly; the reforms generated very wrong
macro-prices, such as outlier exchange
rates, and recurrent recessions.
Forgotten along the way was the fact
that Latin America’s per capita GDP is only
about one-fifth that of the world’s more
affluent economies, which in turn have
an equity gap between rich and poor that
is less than half as large as in the average
Latin American country. Obviously, the
region needs growth and equity to go
together. The aim cannot be the reforms
by themselves, but rather to achieve
sustained growth with equity.
For this, real macroeconomic equilibria are
of crucial relevance. By contrast, a fixation
with low inflation at the expense of a
balanced real economy is harmful for
development. A clear example is provided
by Argentina, which had negative
inflation from 1995 to 2001 before its
economy imploded.
Growth, in fact, requires an environment
that encourages producers to accumulate
factors of production, increase the
quality of their output, and invest their
energies and knowledge in innovation.
Instead, the aggregate demand faced by
Latin American firms and workers was
terribly unstable throughout the 1990s.
Despite low inflation and improvements
in fiscal budgets, the macroeconomic
framework was such that the private
sector went through three stop-and-go
cycles in 15 years. From the point of view
of workers and entrepreneurs, the region
clearly did not achieve macroeconomic
balance during the period.
On the contrary, instability was rampant.
Instability means lower average
productivity as compared to potential
The misguided liberalization of the capital account
There is some validity to the neo-liberal argument that the full opening of the capital
account may deter macroeconomic mismanagement in cases of domestic sources of
instability, such as running large and irresponsible fiscal deficits. But the stronger truth
is that unregulated financial inflows promote exchange-rate overvaluation, large
external deficits and bubbles in domestic financial markets during boom years, whereas
excessive punishment during crises tends to force authorities to adopt overly
contractionary policies.
In practice, the opening of the capital account has meant that emerging-market
economies would end up importing external financial instability, with capital inflows
leading to a worsening of their ‘macroeconomic fundamentals’. Unpredictable capital
flows, in fact, have been a key factor behind the stop-and-go pattern of aggregate
demand in the region.  With their herd-prone behavior, financial operators have
contributed to augmenting the flow of money into ‘successful’ countries during capital
surges, thus producing steep rises in the price of financial assets and real estate as well
as a sharp appreciation of the exchange rate.
This suggests a serious misunderstanding in the neo-liberal definition of ‘sound
fundamentals’. This mistaken definition, together with ‘irrational exuberance’, is what
led to high positive grades for Chile just before the crisis of 1982, for Mexico and
Argentina in 1994, Korea and Thailand in 1996, and all the Latin American emerging
markets in 1996 and 1997. Something really fundamental was missing in the financial
markets’ evaluation of ‘market fundamentals’! The sharp crises in those countries were
the result of a worsening of the real economy, led by massive capital inflows.
The specific road taken by globalization has therefore had a curious outcome. Experts
in financial intermediation — a microeconomic discipline — play a major role in
determining the evolution of domestic macroeconomic equilibria and their volatility
in emerging economies. This is at the core of Latin America’s frustrating performance
under the ‘Washington Consensus’.
productivity, lower profits and lower
corporate savings, all of which deter
capital formation and productive
employment. Major corrections must be
put in place in order to have markets
that are friendly to producers. This is
what we call a real macroeconomics,
or ‘macro-for-development’.
A macroeconomics-for-development
requires a clear and systematic distinction
between what is merely an economic
recovery as opposed to generating
additional productive capacity.
Distinguishing between creating new
capacity and using existing capacity should
be a guiding principle for monetary,
exchange rate and fiscal policy, as well
as for the regulation of capital flows.
To ensure a policy environment that
stimulates growth, countries must strive
to get real macroeconomic fundamentals
right. This implies a sustainable external
deficit, a moderate stock of external
liabilities with a low liquid share, and a
reasonable matching of terms and
currencies. It also means crowding in of
domestic savings, limited real exchange-
rate appreciation and an effective
demand consistent with the production
frontier, together with responsible fiscal
policies and a manageable inflation rate.
Achieving that seems an impossible
challenge with fully open capital
accounts in developing economies.
Following Celso Furtado, we must create
our own development strategies, taking
account of our structural heterogeneities
and understanding the great opportunities
and high risks offered by globalization.
We need to redirect, rectify — in short,
reform — the reforms of the last decade.
Needed are national programs of labor
training, measures for strengthening key
segments of the domestic capital market,
incentives for innovation among small
and medium firms, systematic prudential
regulation of the capital account, and a
greater capacity to adopt a macroeconomic
framework geared to genuine development.
These are some of the missing ingredients
for a sustainable path that will deliver
growth with equity.
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Reformas en América
Latina luego del fracaso del Consenso de




by José Antonio Ocampo,
Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, United Nations
Fifty years after its original
formulation, the essential
truth of the center-periphery
thesis remains intact. Huge
asymmetries in the field of
technology, vulnerability to
external shocks and the
international mobility of
capital and labor continue to
characterize the world
economic system.
‘Leveling the playing field’  is
not a sufficiently potent norm
for redressing existing
imbalances. Instead, efforts
to reform the international
economic system must rely
on the classic principle of
‘special and differentiated
treatment’ and  the notion




The persistence and growth of large
inequalities in the world economy make
it useful to think of the latter as a system
in which opportunities are unevenly
distributed between a center and its
periphery — or, perhaps more accurately,
peripheries. Latin American structuralist
thinkers, under the intellectual leadership
of CEPAL, put forward this idea half a
century ago, and their main thesis
remains valid today.
The major implication of this analysis is
that while national economic, social and
institutional factors obviously matter,
economic opportunities are largely
determined by the position countries
occupy within the world hierarchy.
Fundamental international asymmetries
largely explain why the global economy
is not a ‘level playing field’. Unless such
asymmetries are addressed, world
inequalities would be maintained or may
deepen through time.
This means, in turn, that development is
not a matter of going through ‘stages’
within a uniform pattern associated
with the rise in income per capita.
Development is, rather, the result of
transformations in production and social
structures and the application of
appropriate macroeconomic, financial and
social development strategies, within the
constraints posed by a world hierarchical
system. This was another essential insight
of Latin American structuralism, and Celso
Furtado in particular.
Global economic asymmetries are of
three kinds. The first derives from the
greater macroeconomic vulnerability of
developing countries to external shocks.
This vulnerability has tended to increase
with the tighter integration of the world
economy, and its nature has changed
too. While the transmission of external
shocks through trade remains important,
financial shocks have come to play a
more prominent role, revisiting the
patterns observed during the boom and
financial collapse of the 1920s and 1930s.
Macroeconomic asymmetries are
associated with the fact that
international currencies are the
currencies of the industrial countries
as well as with the lop-sided nature
of capital flows and their relation to
macroeconomic policy in the industrial
and the developing world. Capital flows
are pro-cyclical in most OECD and
developing countries, but the volatility
experienced by the latter is more marked.
More importantly, macroeconomic policy
tends to be counter-cyclical and
independent of capital flows in
developed countries, while in developing
countries pro-cyclical policies tend to
reinforce the capital-account cycle. This
indicates that industrial countries have
more room for adopting counter-cyclical
macroeconomic policies than developing
countries do. To complicate matters,
market players have come to expect and
evaluate authorities on their ability to
adopt such pro-cyclical stance.
The second asymmetry derives from the
high concentration of technical progress
in the developed countries. The diffusion
of technical progress from the source
countries to the rest of the world remains
“relatively slow and uneven”, according to
Raúl Prebisch’s classic formulation. This
reflects, among other factors, the
prohibitive costs of entry into the more
dynamic technological activities and the
rising costs of technology transfers due
to the spread and strengthening of
intellectual property rights. The
combined effect of these factors explains
why, at the global level, the productive
structure has exhibited a high and
persistent concentration of technical
progress in the industrialized countries,
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position in the most dynamic sectors of
international trade and their hegemony
in the establishment of large
transnational enterprises.
The third asymmetry is associated with
the contrast between the high mobility of
capital and the restrictions placed on the
international movement of labor. This
contrast is unique to the present phase
of globalization, since it was not
manifested in the 19th and early 20th
centuries, a period characterized by large
mobility of both capital and labor, or in
the first 25 years after the Second World
War, a period in which both factors
exhibited very little mobility. Large
asymmetries in the international mobility
of the factors of production generate
biases in the distribution of income in
favor of the more mobile factors (capital
and skilled labor) to the detriment of the
less mobile ones (less skilled labor).
It also affects relations between developed
and developing countries inasmuch as
the latter have a relative abundance of
less skilled labor.
The need to correct the asymmetries that
prevail in the international economic
system has been explicitly recognized
since the creation of UNCTAD in the 1960s.
The commitments concerning the flow of
ODA and ‘special and differential
treatment’ for developing countries in
trade issues were some of the partial, yet
relatively frustrating, results of the effort to
build a ‘new international economic order’.
This vision has been radically eroded in
recent decades and then replaced by an
alternative paradigm. It maintains that
the basic aim of the international
economic system should be to ensure a
uniform set of rules — a ‘level playing
field’ — that allows for the efficient
functioning of market forces. Bucking
this trend, though, new international
principles were adopted in the area of
sustainable development at the outset
of the 1990s, notably that which reflects
the existence of ‘common but
differentiated responsibilities’ of
developed and developing countries.
In the new vision of a world economic
system based on a ‘level playing field’, the
developing countries allegedly stand to
gain from the eventual dismantling of
protectionism of ‘sensitive’ sectors in
industrialized countries, the promise
of an international trading system with
clear and stable rules, and the design of
preventive macroeconomic policies that
provide a buffer against international
financial volatility. The correction of the
international asymmetries is recognized
only in relation to the supply of ODA to
the least developed countries.
While all these actions are desirable,
they do not seem sufficient to deliver
greater convergence in levels of
development. In light of the strength of
existing asymmetries, applying the same
measures in very different situations can
even aggravate existing inequalities.
‘Leveling the playing field’ may also
impose restrictions on developing
countries that the industrial countries
never had to face in earlier periods of
their history. They include standards of
intellectual property protection that are
those of countries that generate
technology, and limitations on policy
options for promoting new productive
sectors for either the domestic or
external market.
Thus, the concept of ‘common but
differentiated responsibilities’ and the
already classic principle of ‘special and
differential treatment’ are more appropriate
guidelines for building a more equitable
global order than the norm that has
guided reform efforts in recent decades.
These points suggest what the main
ingredients of international economic
reform vis-à-vis the developing countries
ought to be. From a developing-country
perspective, the first asymmetry implies
that the essential role of the international
financial institutions should be to
compensate for the pro-cyclical impact
of financial markets, smoothing financial
booms and busts at their source through
adequate regulation while giving
countries a larger degree of freedom to
adopt counter-cyclical macroeconomic
policies. This means adequate
surveillance during boom periods to
avoid accumulating excessive macro-
economic and financial risks, and
adequate financing during crises to
smooth the required adjustment in the
face of ‘sudden stops’ of external funds.
Another equally important function is
to act as a countervailing force to the
concentration of credit in private capital
markets, making resources available to
countries and economic agents that
have limited access to capital in
international markets.
With respect to the second asymmetry,
the multilateral trade system must ease
the transfer to developing countries of
the production of primary commodities,
technologically mature manufacturing
activities and standardized services. Above
all, it should avoid erecting obstacles to
such transfers through protection or
subsidies. The system must also accelerate
developing countries’ access to technology
and promote their participation in the
generation of technology and the
production of goods and services with
high technological content.
Developing countries need to enjoy
‘special and differential treatment’ to
help them overcome the obstacles
to a dynamic transformation of their
productive structures. This applies
particularly to the enforcement of
regimes for intellectual property
protection that avoid creating excessive
costs for developing countries and
limiting the modalities for transfers,
along with instruments to promote new
exports — infant export industries — that
increase value added and foster
diversification. Clearly, this must be
done in a way that avoids a sterile
competition among countries to attract
footloose industries.
Lastly, to overcome the third asymmetry,
labor migration must be fully included
in the international agenda through a
globally agreed framework for migration
policies and strict protection of the
human and labor rights of migrants.
Whether global, regional or bilateral,
agreements of this kind must envisage
complementary mechanisms to facilitate
migration, such as the recognition of
educational, professional and labor
credentials, the transferability of social
security benefits, and a low cost for
transferring remittances.
José A. Ocampo and Juan Martin (eds.),
Globalization and Development: A Latin
American and Caribbean Perspective, 2003.10 United Nations Development Programme




transactions impact rich and
poor countries unevenly.
The existing rules are unfair.
But even uniform rules for
unequal partners would
produce unequal outcomes.
From the perspective of
developing countries, such
rules reduce the policy space
so essential for the pursuit of
national development goals.
A fair, transparent and
non-discriminatory system is
necessary to help them
become competitive players
in the world stage.
Absent  such correctives, the
gap between rich and poor
countries can only widen.
 by Deepak Nayyar,
University of Delhi,
India
Uneven development was the
kernel of the structuralist worldview that
had Celso Furtado among its pioneers.
It posited that the asymmetrical links
between the industrialized countries at
the center and the underdeveloped
countries at the periphery of the world
economy fostered development while
perpetuating under-development, thus
widening the gap between countries and
among people. The passage of time has
not quite changed this reality.
In fact, the last quarter of the 20th century
witnessed an increase in economic
inequalities as the income gap between
rich and poor countries, rich and poor
people within countries, and the rich and
the poor in world population widened.
The exclusion of countries and people
from globalization, partly attributable to
the logic of markets, is a fact of life.
The problem is compounded by the
unfair rules of the game for international
economic transactions.
In a world of unequal partners, it is not
surprising that the rules of the game are
asymmetrical in terms of construct and
inequitable in terms of outcome. The
strong have the power to make the rules
and the authority to implement them.
In contrast, the weak can neither set nor
invoke those rules. The problem,
however, takes different forms.
First, there are different rules in different
spheres. The most obvious example
comes from the striking asymmetries that
characterize the rules being set in the
WTO for the international trading system.
While national boundaries should not
matter for trade and capital flows, they
should be clearly demarcated for
technology and labor flows. It follows
that developing countries would provide
access to their markets without matching
access to technology. They would
also accept capital mobility without
a corresponding provision for labor
mobility. The contrast between the free
movement of capital and the unfree
movement of labor across national
boundaries lies at the heart of the
inequality in the rules of the game.
Second, there are rules for some but not
for others. In the WTO, for instance, major
trading countries resort to a unilateral
exercise of power, ignoring the rules
because small countries do not have the
economic strength even if they have the
legal right to retaliate.
The conditions imposed by the IMF and
the World Bank provide a still more
familiar example. There are no rules for
surplus or even deficit countries in the
industrialized world, which do not
borrow from the multilateral financial
institutions. But the IMF and the World
Bank set rules for borrowers in the
developing world and the transition
economies. Their conditionality is meant
in principle to ensure repayment but, in
practice, it imposes conditions to serve
the interests of international banks that
lend to those countries.
The Bretton Woods institutions, then,
act as watchdogs for money-lenders in
international capital markets. What is more,
their stabilization and adjustment
programs seek to harmonize policies and
institutions across countries, in consonance
with the needs of globalization.
Third, the agenda for new rules is a
partisan one. Take the attempt to create a
multilateral agreement on investment in
the WTO, which seeks free access and
national treatment for foreign investors
with provisions to enforce commitments
and obligations towards them. But if the
proposed agreement is so concerned
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surely these should in turn be matched
by some obligations. A ban on restrictive
business practices by transnational
corporations, conformity with anti-trust
laws in home countries or a level playing
field for domestic firms in host countries
also ought to be in the picture. In any
case, such an agreement should not be
lodged in the WTO — nor should the
issue of labor standards, which is simply
not in the WTO domain.
The process of globalization is already
reducing the autonomy of developing
countries in the formulation of economic
policies in their pursuit of development.
The unfair rules further encroach on the
policy space so essential for it.
The existing and prospective rules of the
WTO regime allow few exceptions and
provide little flexibility to countries that
are latecomers to industrialization.
The rules on trade make the selective
protection or strategic promotion of
domestic firms vis-à-vis foreign
competition much more difficult.
The tight system for the protection
of intellectual property rights could
preempt or stifle the development of
domestic technological capabilities.
Similarly, commitments on structural
reform, an integral part of stabilization
and adjustment programs with the IMF
and the World Bank, inevitably prescribe
industrial deregulation, privatization,
trade liberalization and financial
deregulation. And the multilateral
agreement on investment, should it
materialize, would almost certainly
reduce the possibilities of strategic
bargaining with transnational firms.
By and large, the new regime is much
stricter in terms of the law and its
implementation. In comparison, there
was more room for maneuver in the
erstwhile GATT because of special and
differential treatment for developing
countries. The new regime appears rule-
based, but the rules are not uniform. And
it is not clear how or why this is better
than discretion. For taken together, such
rules and conditions are bound to curb
the use of industrial, technology, trade
and financial policy as strategic forms of
intervention to foster industrialization.
Of course, such state intervention was
crucial for development in the success
stories among late-industrializers during
the second half of the 20th century.
The nature of the solution evidently
depends upon the nature of the
problem. Where there are different rules
in different spheres, it is necessary to
make the rules symmetrical across
spheres. Where there are rules for some
but not for others, it is necessary to
ensure they are uniformly applicable to
all. Where the agenda for new rules is
partisan, it is imperative to redress the
balance in the agenda.
But this is not all. Fair rules are necessary
but not sufficient. For a game is not
simply about rules, it is also about
players. The rules must be such that new
or latecomers to the game — the
developing countries — are provided
with the time and space to learn so as to
become competitive players rather than
push-over opponents.
There is, clearly, a pressing need for
greater symmetry in the rules of the
multilateral trading system embodied in
the WTO. The rules of the multilateral
financial institutions, implicit in IMF and
World Bank conditionality, should also
be reshaped so that a standardized
package of policies is not imposed on
countries, irrespective of time and space.
In addition, the agenda for the new rules
demands careful scrutiny for it is shaped
by the interests of industrialized
countries while the needs of
development are largely neglected.
And insofar as a game is not only about
fair rules but also competitive players, it
is essential to revisit the existing
provisions of the unequal agreement on
TRIPs, which was signed at a time when
most people did not understand its
economic implications.
There are some spheres where there are
no rules, such as international financial
markets or cross-border movements of
people that are not even on the agenda.
The time has come to introduce rules to
govern speculative financial flows
constituted mostly by short-term capital
movements, sensitive to exchange rates
and interest rates, in search of capital gains.
It is also perhaps necessary to think about
a new international financial architecture
in which a World Financial Authority
would manage systemic risk associated
with international financial liberalization,
coordinate national action against market
failure or abuse, and act as a regulator in
international financial markets.
It is likewise worth contemplating a
multilateral framework for consular
practices and immigration laws that
would govern cross-border movements
of people, akin to multilateral frameworks
that exist or are sought to be created for
the governance of national laws about
the movement of goods, services,
technology, investment and information
across national boundaries. The essential
aim should be to create a transparent
and non-discriminatory system, based
on rules rather than discretion, for
people who wish to move temporarily
or permanently across borders.
For countries at vastly different levels
of development, there must be some
flexibility, instead of complete rigidity, in
the application of uniform rules. Indeed,
uniform rules for unequal partners can
only produce unequal outcomes. Thus, we
should be concerned with the desirability
of the outcomes and not with the
procedural uniformity of rules.
It is, in principle, possible to formulate
general rules where application is a
function of country or time-specific
circumstances, without resorting to
exceptions. It implies a set of multilateral
rules in which every country has the
same rights but the obligations are a
function of its level of development.
Rights and obligations should not be
strictly symmetrical across countries.
There is, in fact, a clear need for positive
discrimination in favor of countries that
are latecomers to development.
Deepak Nayyar, “Globalization and
Development Strategies”, in John Toye (ed.),
Trade and Development, 2003.
Latecomers to
development need
the time and space to
become competitive.12 United Nations Development Programme
The New Commons vs.
The Second Enclosure
Movement




industry is no longer the
defining feature of the divide
between the center and the
periphery of the world
economic system. Now
development theory must
turn its attention to the
effects of the North’s control
of  ideas and information.
Current debates over
intellectual property rights
are not just about patents and
inventions. They raise
questions that are
fundamental to the well-
being of the poor, such as
how much they will pay for
life-saving drugs, and
fundamental to economic
growth, such as how much a
country must pay in royalties
in order to participate in the
‘information age’.
About 50 years ago, Brazilian
economist Celso Furtado published a
seminal book in which he outlined the
evolution of Brazil’s economy from the
classic pattern of exporting primary
products and importing manufactured
goods to the emergence of a diversified
economy that included the production
of sophisticated manufactured products.
He characterized his country’s trajectory
as typical of ‘under-development’.
At its core, under-development implies
unequal exchange. An ‘underdeveloped
country’ is one that produces low-return
products while buying goods that deliver
high returns to other countries. Today,
manufactured exports play a growing
role in most economies of the Global
South, yet developing countries are
discovering that manufacturing does
not mean high returns.
With the advent of information and
communications technology, growth is
increasingly ‘bit-driven’ so that
rearranging strings of digital ‘bits’ rather
than atoms is now at the high-return
center of the modern economy. Indeed,
appropriating the returns from ideas and
images has become the new definition of
the economic core. This shift presents a
novel set of challenges to developing
countries. The critical question is whether
this state of affairs will help reshape
or rather reinforce the North-South
asymmetry of power that characterizes
the global economic system.
Economic historians like Douglass North
have long contended that property rights
lie at the heart of the economic growth
that has occurred during the last 300 years
of world history. But their analysis has
assumed convergence on a relatively fixed
set of ‘private property institutions’. The
increasingly important role of ideas and
images in the contemporary economy
creates a basis for challenging that
assumption. In particular, the non-rival
character of intangible assets — the  fact
that many people can make use of an
idea at the same time — opens up
exciting possibilities for accelerating
growth in the South.
Instead of convergence around a single
model of property rights, two visions
of property rights compete to determine
what contemporary ‘bit-driven growth’
might mean for global levels of well-being.
If current efforts to preserve monopoly
rights over intangible assets take over
the globe’s leading economic sectors,
the result will be an unprecedented
expansion of the profits of the Northern
corporations that presently dominate
global ownership of those assets and
appropriate the lion’s share of the
returns from them. These corporations
will then solidify their politically
protected monopoly rights while
simultaneously extending them by
transforming an ever larger set of ideas,
information and images — currently
considered part of nature’s shared
cultural heritage — into politically
protected private property. This process,
which has been called the second
enclosure movement, will likely be
accompanied by a corresponding
increase in their power to shape the
political processes that determine the
rules of the global economic game.
But there is a competing model
emerging. In the competing vision,
property rights can be restructured along
the lines pioneered by the open-source
software community to create a new
commons of productive tools that allows
for both a more egalitarian redistribution
of intangible assets and a wider, more
effective engagement of human ingenuity
to create innovative solutions.International Poverty Centre   In Focus   April  2005    13
Redefining ‘ownership’
as the right to distribute,
rather than the right




There are really two halves to the second
enclosure movement. The defensive side
seeks to intensify the enforcement of
politically protected monopoly rights to
exclude others from using information
that has been defined as ‘private property’.
From the point of view of well-being in
the South, efforts to enforce proprietary
monopoly returns on AIDS drugs may be
the most immediately threatening aspect
of this agenda. The offensive side involves
taking information that has been
considered part of ‘nature’, or the common
cultural and informational heritage of
humankind, and transforming it into
‘private property’. These efforts range from
the almost ridiculous, like a Texas
company patenting basmati rice, to
agendas with implications so broad that
they are hard to comprehend, such as
turning sections of the human genome
into ‘private property’.
If both halves prevail, the second enclosure
movement could result in a global
redistribution of property comparable
to the eradication of the commons that
ushered in agrarian capitalism in Western
Europe 300 years ago.
The original enclosure movement may
have realigned property rights in a way
that avoided the tragedy of the commons,
setting in motion a process of growth so
powerfully productivity-enhancing as to
compensate for its negative distributional
effects. The second enclosure movement
is much less likely to have growth as a
positive by-product. It is a recipe for global
monopoly that is likely to stifle innovation
at the same time that it concentrates
wealth — an invitation to what some
caution could be a New Dark Ages.
Given the prospect of a second enclosure
movement, the new commons presents an
attractive alternative. Its appeal lies both
in the distributional implications of a
new commons and its potential for
raising the rate of innovation and value
creation in the world.
Unlike the old commons, shared property
rights do not create a problem of over-
use. Expanding the number of people
using the new commons does not
deplete it; instead they increase its value.
Making key software tools available in a
new commons, where property is defined
as the right to distribute these tools
instead of the right to exclude others
from using them, could boost global
rates of innovation and redistribute
income from North to South at once.
The innovative potential unleashed by
the new commons can be likened to
what might have happened if steam
engines had been available to anyone
who wanted to use them during the
early phases of the industrial revolution.
Expanding the new commons would be
redistributive in two ways. First, by
creating new competition for their
products, it would reduce returns to
existing owners of intellectual property
in both North and South at the same
time that it increases the returns to
human capital by giving people more
intangible assets to work with.
Second, expanding the new commons
should shift the growth of assets and
incomes from North to South, given that
ownership of existing intangible assets —
and the returns they generate — are
highly concentrated in the North while
workers in the South are more deprived
of them than their Northern counterparts.
As the ‘digital revolution’ matures, how
much economic space is each of these two
ideal types destined to occupy? Neither
model is likely to dominate completely.
The future will be some complex
combination of the two. Nonetheless, if
the juggernaut of the second enclosure
movement could be slowed and the space
available to the new commons expanded,
it would have profound effects on the
welfare of the world’s citizens.
The political divisions in this fight over
property rights are not quite as simple as
might be expected. The Northern
corporate world is not completely unified.
IBM, which must be considered one of the
leading ‘Intangible Asset Barons’, has just
decided to turn over 500 of its software
patents to open-source developers.
The countries of the South are the
natural allies of those who are on the
side of the new commons in the North. It
is in the collective interests of the South
to push politically for changes in the
global property regime and to expand
the market for open-source software.
If there is a split among corporations and
entrepreneurs in the North, and if the
South has the perception and will to take
advantage of it, the South could make a
real difference.
Public sector technocrats in the South
have seen the advantage of the new
commons. Legislation backing the use of
open-source software is spreading in the
more technologically advanced countries
of the South. It is unclear whether
corporate users in the South who are not
subsidiaries of Northern transnationals
will be more likely to take advantage of
the new commons than their
counterparts in the North.
On one hand, the use of Linux is growing
at 20% a year in China and two-thirds of
Chinese software developers expect to
be writing Linux applications. On the
other hand, India’s recent amendment of
its patent laws to make them more
compatible with WTO standards suggests
that the local expansion of hi-tech
industry may increase pressure for
conformity to Northern property rights
rather than expanding the ranks of allies
of the new commons.
The evolving political economy of the
contest between the new commons and
the second enclosure movement is
complex and difficult to analyze. It is
hard to know whether support for the
new commons will remain a public sector
project in the South or become a
politically powerful public-private
coalition. The countries of the South will
need a new incarnation of Celso Furtado
to provide analytical insight and clear
advice to policy makers.
Peter Evans, “The New Commons vs. The
Second Enclosure Movement” , Studies in
Comparative International Development
(forthcoming).14 United Nations Development Programme 14 United Nations Development Programme
IN TRIBUTE The Case for Being a
Pedantic Utopian
In a world divided between
pedantic technicians who
think they have all the
answers and utopian
reformers who believe theirs
is the only vision possible,
there are exceptional
individuals who can marry
vision and method and put
them both to work — and
with excellent results.
Celso Furtado was one such
individual, and we shall miss
him so.
by Paul Streeten, Boston University, USA
Many types of new international or global institutions have been proposed, such
as a global central bank, a global investment trust that would recycle current account
surpluses to capital-starved countries, a global income tax, a global environmental
protection agency, a global competition policy, a global energy policy, an agency
concerned with international migration, and so on. Two types of objection can be made
to these proposals for institutional reform and innovation in the area of international
cooperation — one on grounds of desirability, the other on grounds of feasibility.
First, it may be said that creative institutions are not designed on a drawing board but
are the spontaneous responses to challenging situations. Designed institutions, such as
the League of Nations, the World Economic Conference of 1933, the International Trade
Charter, the Special Drawing Rights and others all failed, while the multinational
corporation, the Eurocurrency market, the globalization of the 24-hour capital market
and the swap arrangements between central banks, none of which sprang from grand
designs, are considerable successes. The Bretton Woods institutions and, to some
extent, the United Nations are the exception, but they were born after a world war and
the complete breakdown of a previous order.
My reply would be that these spontaneous institutions themselves need designed
institutions to regulate them. The debt crisis was a direct result of the unregulated
recycling of OPEC surpluses by greedy lenders to profligate borrowers. Had something
like an International Investment Trust that would have recycled the money from the oil
surpluses on acceptable terms to carefully selected projects and countries been in place
in the 1970s, we would have been spared many of the present pains. So much then
suffices in reply to the charge that the proposals are undesirable.
A different criticism is that, though desirable, designed institutions are not feasible.
They are utterly unrealistic and utopian, and the political constraints too severe.
There are five replies to such criticisms, in defense of utopian proposals.
First, utopian thinking can be useful as a framework for analysis. Just as physicists
assume an atmospheric vacuum for some purposes, so policy analysts can assume a
political vacuum from which they can start afresh. The physicists’ assumption plainly
would not be useful for the design of parachutes, but can serve other purposes well.
Similarly, when thinking of tomorrow’s problems, utopianism is not helpful. But for
long-term strategic purposes, it is essential.
Second, the utopian vision gives a sense of direction, which can get lost in approaches
that are preoccupied with the feasible. In a world that is regarded as the second-best of
all feasible worlds, everything becomes a necessary constraint. All vision is lost.
Third, excessive concern with the feasible tends to reinforce the status quo. In negotiations,
such concern strengthens the hand of those opposed to any reform. Unless the case for
change can be represented in the same detail as the case for no change, it tends to be lost.
Fourth, it is sometimes the case that the conjuncture of circumstances changes quite
suddenly and the constellation of forces, unexpectedly, turns out to be favorable to
even radical innovation. Unless we are prepared with a carefully worked out, detailed
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default. Nobody would have expected the end of communism in Central and Eastern
Europe, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the break-
up of Yugoslavia, the marketization of China, the end of apartheid in South Africa or the
spread of democracy in West Asia and North Africa.
Fifth, the utopian reformers themselves can constitute a pressure group, countervailing
the self-interested pressures of the obstructionist groups. Ideas thought to be utopian
have become realistic at moments in history when large numbers of people support
them, and those in power have to yield to their demands. The demand for ending
slavery or the women’s or the environmental movements are historical examples.
It is for these five reasons that utopians should not be discouraged from formulating
their proposals and from thinking the unthinkable, unencumbered by the inhibitions
and obstacles of political constraints. They should elaborate them in the same detail
that the defenders of the status quo devote to its elaboration and celebration.
Utopianism and idealism will then turn out to be the most realistic vision.
It is well-known that there are three types of economist: those who can count and
those who can’t. But being only able to count up to two, I want to distinguish between
two types of people. Let us call them, for want of a better name, the Pedants and the
Utopians. The Pedants or technicians are those who know all the details about the way
things are and are working; they know them so well that they have acquired an
emotional vested interest in keeping them this way. I have come across such characters
in the British civil service, in the bureaucracy of the World Bank, and elsewhere.
They are admirable people but they are conservative — and not good agents of reform.
On the other hand there are the Utopians, the idealists, the visionaries who dare think
the unthinkable. They are also admirable, many of them young people. But they lack the
attention to detail that the Pedants have. When the day of the revolution comes, they
will have entered it on the wrong date in their diaries and fail to turn up — or, if they
do turn up, they will be by mistake on the wrong side of the barricades.
What we need is a marriage between the Pedants and the Utopians, between the
technicians who pay attention to the details and the idealists who have the vision of a
better future. There will be tensions in combining the two, but they will be creative
tensions. We need Pedantic Utopians or Utopian Pedants who will work out in
considerable detail the ideal world and ways of getting to it, and promote the good
cause with informed fantasy. Otherwise, when the opportunity arises, we shall miss it
for lack of preparedness and lose out to the opponents of reform, to those who want
to preserve the status quo.
I first met Celso Furtado in 1963 when he was in charge of SUDENE, the government
agency he helped create in order to overcome the backwardness of his native region,
Brazil’s drought-ridden Northeast. From there he went on to become his country’s first
Planning Minister, where he developed a Triennial Development Plan that was a last-
ditch attempt at combining economic stability and development within the confines of
a democratic system in the throes of disintegration. But the opponents of reform got the
upper hand, and the coup of 1964 would condemn Furtado to an academic life in exile.
From the moment we met I was deeply impressed by Celso’s vision, integrity and
strength. He was a man of both intellect and passion. His passion was to transform the
archaic social relations and productive structures of underdeveloped countries so as to
create the conditions for self-reliant development and greater well-being for their
excluded masses. To this passion he applied analytic rigor and ingenuity. His body of
work is a living testament to this unusual combination of idealism and method.
I have been in touch with Furtado ever since, admiring both his mind and his commitment.
Celso, indeed, was one among those rare creatures that appear only once in a while —




turn of events renders
yesterday’s utopian
proposals into today’s
only feasible ones.International Poverty Centre
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